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Quantifying the Impact of Economic Incentives on Firms’ Food Safety Responsiveness: 
The Case of Red Meat and Poultry Processing Sector in Canada 
 
Introduction 
Although the food supply in most developed countries is generally considered to be safe 
(Huff and Owen, 1999), modern industrial food systems cannot fully eradicate the potential 
disease-causing agents in food
1. Further, a number of high-profile ‘scares’ globally, have served 
to enhance consumer awareness and concerns about food safety (GAO/RCED, 1996)
2. Although 
Canada has not experienced a major outbreak of food-borne disease in recent years, relatively 
‘minor’ outbreaks are reported quite regularly (CFIA, 2003). Further, food safety has recently 
become a more prominent issue since a case of BSE in cattle was reported in Alberta in August 
2003. 
Estimates suggest that the costs associated with food-borne disease are substantial. For 
example, the Economic Research Service (ERS) of United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) estimates that the annual cost of food-borne illness and premature death in the United 
States is around $1.1 to $1.3 billion over 20 years (Crutchfield et al., 1997). Over half of all such 
cases are linked to contaminated meat and poultry products (GAO/RECD, 1996). Many of these 
costs may only be partly imposed on food processors. However, in the presence of food safety 
risks, firms may realize that the direct (e.g. liability law suits) and indirect (e.g. loss of 
                                                 
1 The US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) classifies the causes of food-borne illness as follows: 
(1) bacterial pathogens; (2) chemical agents; (3) viral pathogens, and (4) parasite pathogens.  Foods may contain a 
range of bacterial and pathogenic agents that are widely present in the natural environment and can occur in food 
through production systems, cross contamination etc. Further, microbial pathogens may enter streams and into 
human water supplies through feedlots or pasture run-off. Chemical agents include naturally-occurring toxins, for 
example paralytic shellfish poisoning and mycotoxins, and heavy metals. These chemical agents can cause a 
variety of gastrointestinal, neurologic, respiratory and other symptoms (Weersink et al., 1998; GAO/RCED, 
1996). 
2 In North America, most notable is the Jack-in-the-Box case, where four children in the Pacific North West of the 
US died and hundred of others became ill from eating hamburgers contaminated with E. coli in 1993 (Spriggs and 
Isaac, 2001).   2
reputation) costs of food safety failures are significantly greater than the costs of mitigation (i.e. 
costs of implementing food safety controls) (Caswell and Modjuszka, 1996). Moreover, potential 
consumer reactions to real or perceived food safety risks, for example “product avoidance” and 
“brand switching”, can provide incentives for food processors to undertake precautions to reduce 
food-borne hazards through production processes (Henson and Caswell, 1999). 
There is an on-going debate involving both economists and policy-makers regarding the 
most effective and desirable mechanisms to achieve an ‘appropriate’ level of food safety.   
However, much of this debate has arguably tended to over-emphasize the role of government 
regulation and the shortcomings of the market, whilst ignoring wider economic incentives for 
food processors to adopt food safety controls. Further, there is little systematic evidence 
regarding the effectiveness of incentive and/or market-oriented mechanisms. Indeed, much of the 
existing analysis fails to address the most economically efficient manner in which to regulate 
food safety. This contradicts the fact that the major challenge facing policy-makers is the design 
of a system that assures consumers of a safe food supply while avoiding draconian measures that 
hamper the competitiveness of the food industry, by curtailing the incentives for producers with 
little marginal benefit from improved food safety (Henson and Caswell, 1999).  
The purpose of this study was, therefore, to investigate empirically the role of alternative 
economic incentives for firms to adopt enhanced food safety controls and the potential impact, in 
turn, of firm and market-specific characteristics. This paper reports the results of the second of a 
two-stage research program (see Jayasinghe-Mudalige and Henson, 2003 for the outcome of the 
first stage) that collects and analyses data from a survey of firms in the Canadian red meat and 
poultry processing sector.   3
Literature Review 
Buzby et al. (2001) and Loader and Hobbs (1999) suggest three elements that create 
incentives for firms to adopt enhanced food safety controls: (1) market forces; (2) food safety 
laws and regulation; and (3) product liability laws. Much of this literature has, however, 
downplayed the role of market-based incentives, although more recently the environmental (see, 
for example; Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Segerson, 1986) and food economics (see, for example 
Henson and Holt, 2000; Segerson, 1999) literature has begun to acknowledge the wider 
economic incentives that influence such firm-level behaviour. 
Regulatory incentives to adopt food safety controls are provided by public legislation, 
where regulations vary substantially both between countries and between states/provinces within 
countries. Firms that are non-compliance can be subject to various penalties imposed by the 
courts and/or government agencies in terms of fines, product recalls and temporary or permanent 
closure (see, Spriggs and Isaac, 2001 on the Canadian food safety regulatory system). Product 
liability laws are characterized by criminal and/or civil sanctions with potential financial 
compensation for those affected and punitive damages for the responsible parties
3 (Buzby et al., 
2001; Holleran et al., 1999). The underlying economic premise of product liability is, therefore, 
that people and firms have incentives to produce safer products if they must fully compensate 
those harmed by their products
4. Thus, potential liability is one part of a firm’s anticipated costs 
of operation and firms should take the optimal amount of food safety precaution as they attempt 
to minimize costs (Buzby and Frenzen, 1999). According to Antle (1995), both of these 
                                                 
3 Here criminal and civil sanctions possess implications for the prosecution of a lawsuit, because they are 
characterized by two different standards of proof. The former is generally based on public regulations and statutory 
instruments, whilst the later is associated with non-governmental, non-regulatory approaches. 
4 Buzby and Frenzen (1999) identify three main “causes of action” associated with product liability for which 
plaintiffs can receive compensation: (a) strict product liability; (b) negligence; and (c) breach of express or implied 
warranty.   4
approaches is used to varying degrees to secure a safe food supply in developed countries, 
although with statutory safety standards used most frequently as the principal approach. 
Holleran et al. (1999) and Holleran and Bredahl (1997) suggest that the incentives for 
firms to adopt food safety controls stem from both firm-driven “internal incentives” and 
customer/regulation-driven “external incentives”. The authors indicate that such internal 
incentives include the costs and benefits directly associated with a firm’s operational processes 
affected by adoption, for example improved management of the firm’s activities, reduced 
product failure rates etc. The pressure created by suppliers and customers, the legal environment, 
and the extent to level which a firm penetrates a particular food markets are but a few of the 
external incentives affecting a firm’s food safety control decision. 
Unlike the economic literature on the environment, workplace safety, truth in advertising 
and ethics in procurement policy, for example, there is a paucity of research on the role of 
market and non-market incentives for food safety and/or quality controls
5. Implementation of the 
ISO 9000 series of standards in various food processing sectors in the United States (see for 
example Mumma et al., 2002; Capmany et al., 2000), United Kingdom (see for example Zaibet 
and Bredahl, 1997; Manchester Business School, 1996), and several other countries (see for 
example Turner et al., 2000; Carlson and Carlson, 1996) has been the focus of much of the 
literature that does exist. This suggests that ISO 9000 is implemented by most firms in response 
to market-based incentives such as internal efficiency and customer requirements, whilst both 
regulatory and liability incentives have played a less significant role. 
                                                 
5 Nakamura et al., (2001) and Henriques and Sadorsky (1995), for example, examine the incentives for a firm to 
formulate an environmental control plan in Japan and Canada respectively. Khanna and Damon (1998) evaluate 
incentives for firms to participate in the voluntary 33/50 programs for the chemical industry in the United States. 
Wu and Babcock (1999), Segerson and Miceli (1998), Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) and Stranlund (1995) 
investigate whether voluntary agreements between firms and the government are likely to be more efficient than 
mandatory approaches.   5
Although HACCP has been subject to intense technical and economic analysis in recent 
years, few studies have explored empirically the wide-ranging incentives for adoption at the firm 
level (see for example Henson and Holt, 2000; Henson and Northen, 1998). Studies that have 
been undertaken, however, conclude that the impact of market, regulatory and liability incentives 
varies according to firm and market-specific characteristics, especially in the US and European 
food sectors where HACCP has increasingly become a regulatory requirement. Little such 
research has been undertaken in Canada, especially utilising quantitative analysis. One exception 
is Mehta and Wilcock (1996) that examine the potential motives for firms in the Canadian food 
sector to implement quality system standards such as ISO 9000. 
Although these previous studies provide a good insight into the motives for food 
processors to adopt enhanced food safety controls, they are subject to certain limitations. For 
example, many lack a clearly-defined economic framework and analysis is limited to simple 
ranking and/or qualitative methods (for example Carlson and Carlson, 1996; Mehta and Wilcock, 
1996). Further, a number disregard the effects of firm and market characteristics on adoption 
decisions (for example Manchester Business School, 1996). More generally, there is a need for a 
more rigorous economic analysis of the entire motive set faced by food processors to adopt 
enhanced food safety controls. 
A relatively large number of previous studies use “benefit-cost analysis” to examine the 
overall gains to different food sectors from adopting certain food safety and quality metasystems, 
in particular HACCP. This literature has explored the adoption of HACCP in the US red meat 
and poultry processing sector (see for example Ollinger and Mueller, 2003; Golan et al., 2000; 
Antle, 2000; Jenson and Unnevehr, 1999; Calatore and Caswell, 1999; Crutchfield et al., 1997), 
as well as other food sectors in the US and other countries (see for example Cato and Lima dos   6
Santos, 2000 on the frozen shrimp industry in Bangladesh and Zaibet, 2000 on the Oman fish 
industry). Whilst the majority of these papers predict net gains to the sectors examined, they 
suggest that smaller firms typically achieve lower benefits and accrued higher costs, for example 
in the adoption of HACCP. 
Overall, the existing literature suggests that the motivation for food businesses to 
implement both public and private food safety controls reflect the prior expectations of decision-
makers in those firms regarding the potential benefits and costs associated with adoption. In 
cases where businesses perceive the “costs” of implementation to be high relative to the expected 
“benefits” and when the difficulties associated with adoption cannot be easily avoided, there may 
be less motivation for managers to implement enhanced food safety controls. In situations where 
both private and public approaches are interconnected and operate ‘side-by-side’, however, it is 
important to understand the individual incentives to implement food safety controls at the firm 
level and the role that regulations has on these incentives. A case in point is the meat and poultry 
processing sectors in US, Canada and many other developed countries (Henson and Hooker, 
2001). 
The current study presents a comprehensive analysis of the economic incentives, related 
to market, regulatory and liability forces, for food processing firms to adopt enhanced food 
safety controls. It is the first such analysis to be undertaken within the context of the Canadian 
food processing sector. Firms within this sector are differently subject to regulation at the 
federal, provincial and/or municipality levels. At the same time, distinct market forces play a 
significant role, alongside regulations, in influencing the controls that firms implement. In turn, 
such forces can act to improve the functioning of government regulation, and thereby diminish 
the incidence of non-market failures (see for example Wolf, 1986, 1979).   7
Methods 
This paper presents the results of the second stage of a two-stage research program. In the 
first stage, a series of in-depth interviews (n=36) with quality assurance managers in meat 
processing and poultry processing firms in Ontario was conducted. These aimed to identify the 
incentives for firms to adopt enhanced food safety controls. Interviews were recorded and 
transcribed. The content of the interview scripts was then analyzed using the N-Vivo qualitative 
data analysis software, which classified these incentives into 10 major categories (Figure 1). 
The second stage was designed to “quantify” the extent to which these 10 individual 
incentives influence firm adoption of enhanced food safety controls. A questionnaire-based 
survey was conducted with a national sample of Federally-registered (FR) and Provincially-
licensed (PL) red meat and poultry processing plants in Canada (n=822). The data from 279 
firms (representing a 34 percent response rate) were analyzed using a number of quantitative 
analytical methods, including Ordered Logistic Regression (OLR) and the development of an 
Incentive-Related Index. This paper in particular reports the results from the first of these 
methods. 
The outcome of stage one was used to develop a conceptual framework loosely based on 
the models presented in Nakamura et al. (2001), Segerson (1999), Caswell et al. (1998) and 
certain agency models of the firm presented by Williamson (1986) and Jenson and Meckling 
(1976). In this framework, incentives for a manager to adopt enhanced food safety controls, and 
thus to be food safety responsive, is integrated into a utility function.  Other than overall profits 
from the firm’s operations, the “manager’s utility function” is characterized by the ‘intrinsic   8































































































Economic Incentives for Adopting Food Safety Controls
   9
value’ the manager receives from their food safety responsive behaviour. To begin, it is assumed 
that the decision maker of the firm i maximizes their utility Ui = u (v, r, c)
6, which is conditional 
on Yi and Ii with respect to Di.  Thus, maximizing Ui: 
 
Ui = u [v (DiIi), r (DiFi), c (DiFi)]   (1) 
 
Where Di is the decision variable that describes the level of food safety controls adopted by firm 
i. In an attempt to identify the factors that maximize the decision maker’s utility with respect to 
food safety (Ui), emphasis must be placed on the manager’s attitudes and perceptions with 
respect to the incentives they face. The term v (DiIi) can, in turn, be specified to represent this
7; 
that is to reflect the attitudinal and perceptual variables associated with the individual incentives 
(Ii) represented in Figure 1. 
The terms r(DiFi) and c(DiFi) of Equation 1 denote firm i’s conditional revenue and 
cost functions, respectively, in which Fi stands for the firm and market-specific characteristics of 
firm  i including (given) past managerial decisions. Thus, the profit of the firm
8 (πi) can be 
characterized by πi = r(DiFi) – c(DiFi), where it is assumed that profit is only one objective, 
amongst others, that determine the firm’s performance related to the level of food safety. 
Estimation of quality-related cost functions and revenue, however, poses difficulties because of 
unreported financial data, whilst product or factor prices are judged to be implausible (Antle, 
2000; Segerson, 1999 and Caswell et al., 1998). Thus, to avoid the difficulties associated with 
estimating the profit equation [i.e. r(DiFi) – c(DiFi)] empirically, it is assumed that these firm 
and market-specific characteristics reflect the firm’s ability to earn profits. Similarly to 
                                                 
6 Assuming u(r, c, v) is concave in its arguments. 
7 Which uses this term to explain the intrinsic value the manager of firm i derives from implementing recommended 
public and private environmental controls.   10
Nakamura  et al. (2001), the maximization problem in Equation 1 is solved to obtain the 
following ‘reduced’ (Equation 2) and ‘regression’ (Equation 3) forms for Di, where εi is the error 
term: 
 
Di = ƒ (Ii, Fi)     (2) 
Di = ƒ (Ii, Fi) + εi   (3) 
 
The analysis is complicated by the fact that Canadian food processing firms implement a 
range of food safety practices (Baldwin et al., 1999), whilst such actions are induced by 
numerous incentives (see for example Buzby et al., 2001; Shavell, 1987) as identified in Stage 
One of the research, many of which are ‘unobservable’ at the firm level (Hair et al., 1995) and 
highly subjective to individual managers (Buchanan, 1969). Consequently, a “Food Safety 
Responsiveness Index” (FSRI) was computed as the mean of the scores given in response to a set 
of statements regarding the firm and food safety. While accepting the difficulties associated with 
specifying individual incentives (Ii) in the empirical model, Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
and the computation of multi-item summated scales (Henson and Traill, 2000; Hair et al., 1995; 
De Vellis, 1991; Hughes et al., 1986) were used to develop estimable variables for the incentives 
of interest. Firm and market-specific variables were incorporated explicitly as variables to 
represent Fi in the empirical model. 
The individual incentives identified in stage-one were specified as “constructs” in the 
“measurement model”. Attitudinal statements selected from the interview scripts to reflect the 
observable characteristics of each incentive were employed as “indicators” to represent these 
constructs. Likewise, attitudinal statements were also used as indicators of the FSRI. A 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 It is assumed that the production function characterizes the overall profit of the firm and the level of resources 
allocated to produce appropriate levels of food safety satisfies the arguments of homogeneity, concavity etc.   11
validation item (see Henson and Traill, 2000) for each construct was also included in the 
questionnaire
9. Respondents were asked to score each statement on a five-point Likert scale 
(Oppenheim, 1992) from “strongly agree” at one extreme to “strongly disagree” at the other.  
Scores for the statements were subject to a number of scale purification techniques.   
Subsequently, summated scores were derived for each incentive and the FSRI. 
Given the choice of variables based on the results of Stage One, the a priori theoretical 
inter-relationships between variables and the practical constraints posed by interpretation of an 
ordered logistic regression (see, for example Borooah, 2002 and Pampel, 2000, Greene, 2000), 
the following specification of the empirical model was applied (Table 1): 
  
Di = β0 + β1 * CT + β2 * HE + β3 * PE + β4 * GP + β5 * SL + β6 * RT + β7 * CP + β8 * ER + β9 * AR + β10 * 
LL + σ1  * FR+ σ2  * ON + σ3  * VS + σ4 * S + σ5 * M + σ6 * L +σ2  * VL + σ3  * SG + σ4 * CB + σ5 * 
MF + σ6 * ST + σ7  * BF + σ8  * PK + σ9* LG + σ10 * PL + σ11 * OA + σ12  * GC + σ13  * FS + σ14 * RS 
+ σ15 * RU + σ16* PC + σ17  * WS + σ18 * WI + σ19* LC + σ20* PV + σ21 * IP + σ22* IT + εi    (4) 
 
Four separate models were specified to represent Federally-registered (FR) and 
Provincially-licensed (PL) meat processing firms in Canada as a whole and Ontario specifically, 
namely: (a) ALL-PR consists of both FR and PL firms in Canada (n = 251); (b) ALL-ON 
consists of both FR and PL firms in Ontario (n = 118); (c) FR-PR consists of only FR firms in 
Canada (n = 182), and (d) PL-PR consists of only PL firms in Ontario (n = 69). Maximum 
Likelihood methods were used to estimate the parameters of the models using PLUM logistic 
regression. 
                                                 
9 In accordance with recommended good practice associated with conducting CFA, these statements were mixed 
randomly and presented in the questionnaire without the relevant “construct” heading (i.e. associated incentive) 
to avoid potential biased.  Care was taken to avoid unduly lengthy statements, double negatives, double-barrelled 
statements and jargon, since these are all potential sources of confusion. A number of statements were 
intentionally ‘inverted’ to ensure that respondents thought about each question rather than hurriedly gave the 
same response to each. At the end of pilot testing, there were 72 statements. Thus, five indicators per construct x 
10 constructs + 12 statements to estimate FSRI + 10 validation items were included in the final questionnaire.    12
Table 1 - Variables defined for the empirical Model: 
Symbol Used  Corresponding Variable  Remarks 
Dependent Variable and Parameter Estimates 
Di  Ordered variables derived from Food Safety Responsive Index  D = 1 to 5 
δ  Cut-off points for ordered dependent variables   
β0  The intercept term   
βi  The estimates for incentives   Explanatory variables 
σi  The estimates for firm- and market-specific characteristics   Dummy variables 
εi  The stochastic error term   
Continuous Explanatory Variables to Represent Incentives (Yi) 
CT Financial  Implications/Cost 
HE  Human Resource Efficiency 
PE Procedural  Efficiency 
GP Good  Practice 
SL Sales 
RP Reputation 
CP Commercial  Pressure 
ER  Existing Government Regulations  
AR Anticipating  Government  Regulations 
 
LL Liability  Laws   
Dummy Variables to Represent Firm- and Market-specific Characteristics (Xi) 
Type (based on level of meat inspection) and location of the firm (Province) 
FR  Federally-registered firms  FR = 1; otherwise = 0 
ON  Ontario  ON = 1; otherwise = 0 
Size of the firm (Based on number of employees) 
VS  Very small (0 – 10)  VS = 1; otherwise = 0 
S  Small (11 – 25)  S = 1; otherwise = 0 
M  Medium (26 – 100)  M = 1; otherwise = 0 
L  Large (101 – 250)  L = 1; otherwise = 0 
VL  Very large (> 250)  VL = 1; otherwise = 0 
Activity of the firm 
SG  Slaughtering  SG = 1; otherwise = 0 
CB  Cutting and boning  CB = 1; otherwise = 0 
MF  Manufacturing of processed products  MF = 1; otherwise = 0 
ST  Storage (certified by the CFIA)  ST = 1; otherwise = 0 
Products of the firm 
BF  Beef  BF = 1; otherwise = 0 
PK  Pork  PK= 1; otherwise = 0 
LG  Lamb and goat  LG = 1; otherwise = 0 
PL  Poultry  PL = 1; otherwise = 0 
OA  Other animals  OA = 1; otherwise = 0 
Customers of the firm 
GC  National grocery chains and supermarkets  GC = 1; otherwise = 0 
FS  Food services chains  FS = 1; otherwise = 0 
RS  Retail stores  RS = 1; otherwise = 0 
RU  Local Restaurants  RU = 1; otherwise = 0 
PC  Meat processors  PC = 1; otherwise = 0 
WS  Wholesalers  WS = 1; otherwise = 0 
WI  Walk-in customers  WI = 1; otherwise = 0 
Sales area of the firm  
LC  Within the local municipality  LC = 1; otherwise = 0 
PV  Within the Province firm operates  PV = 1; otherwise = 0 
IP  Inter-provincial sales  IP = 1; otherwise = 0 
IT  Exports to the USA and other countries  IT = 1; otherwise = 0   13
Estimates of logged odds (logits) and the probabilities derived for the independent 
variables of each model were used to interpret the nature of each explanatory variable (i.e. 
continuous or dummy) and the relative size and sign of its effect. 
 
Results 
The process of quantifying each incentives influence on food safety responsiveness 
involved the derivation of ordered dependent variables, estimation of scale values for each 
incentive, and the use of Ordered Logistic Regression (OLR) techniques to estimate coefficients 
for the influence of the value of the FSRI. The first step towards deriving the dependent variable 
was to estimate the FSRI for each firm using the scores given by respondents (n = 251) to 12 
attitudinal statements
10. The distribution of the FSRI amongst the firms ranged from 2.5 (the 
lowest) to 4.83 (the highest), with a mean of 3.68 and Standard Deviation of 0.52 (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 - Distribution of values of the food safety responsive index:   
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   14
Next, five ordered dependent variables (Di = 1 to 5) were developed for the purpose of 
the OLR analysis using the “lower” and “upper” limits for the FSRI (Table 2). These five 
categories exemplify that, all else being equal, it is more that a firm included in a higher category 




Table 2 - Ordered dependent variables to represent firms’ food safety responsiveness:   
 
Range of the Index  Variable 
Name 
Degree of 






(n = 251) 
Percentage 
(%) 
D = 1  Very Low  2.50 *  2.92  27  10.8 
D = 2  Low  3.00  3.42  51  20.3 
D = 3  Medium  3.50  3.92  100  39.8 
D = 4  High  4.00  4.42  59  23.5 
D = 5  Very High  4.50  4.83 *  14  5.6 
* Theoretically, the lower and upper limits should be 0.00 and 5.00, respectively. However, the minimum and the 
maximum value estimated for the index were 2.50 and 4.83. 
 
The scale values for the individual incentives were included as explanatory variables in 
the models. In an attempt to eliminate superfluous items, the Cronbach Alpha (Cronbach, 1951) 
of each statement was estimated (Table 3). The next step of the scale purification process was to 
assess the unidimensionality of statements using Principal Axis Factoring. The results
12 indicated 
that the scales were indeed unidimensional; except for two statements the factor loadings were 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 The scores given by respondents to a number of statements were re-inverted before calculating the index.  To 
evaluate the validity, unidimensionality and reliability of these statements, the standard tests were conducted. 
11 The distribution of firms within the five categories of dependent variables in the ALL-PR and ALL-ON samples 
showed a similar pattern with a mean of 2.9 (p = 0.58).  However, the distribution of the FR-PR sample showed a 
‘left-skewed’ pattern with a mean of 3.3 (p = 0.66), whilst there was a ‘right-skew’ in the PL-PR sample with a 
mean of 2.1 (p = 0.42).  This suggests that the majority of FR firms were “medium” to “highly” food safety 
responsive, whist most PL firms were more “highly” food safety of responsiveness. 
12 The detail results are not reported considering the lengthiness of paper, however, can be supplied to any interested 
reader upon request from the authors.     15
greater than 0.35. Amongst the 38 statements selected through the reliability analysis, factor 
loadings of 33 (87%) were more than 0.4. 
 
Table 3 – Procedures and the results of testing scale reliability: 
 








Mean Score  Standard Deviation  
CT 5  0.733  5  15.23  3.89 
HE 5  0.505  3  9.96  2.10 
PE 5  0.496  3  10.92  2.01 
GP 5  0.701  4  16.63  2.19 
SL 5  0.701  3  10.19  2.58 
RT 5  0.662  4  14.45  2.63 
CP 5  0.817  4  12.95  3.67 
ER 5  0.452  4  11.04  2.70 
AR 5  0.782  5  17.97  2.92 




13 was measured (Cronbach and Meehl 1955), with the single 
validation item included for each incentive applied as the alternative measurement instrument to 
develop the MTMM matrix (Campbell and Fiske, 1959). The results indicated that majority of 
coefficients were correlated positively and greater than any other corresponding coefficient in the 
same column in the MTMM matrix. Thus, there was substantive evidence of construct validity. 
The logistic regression results (Table 4 and Annexes 1 to 3) show that the four models 
were significant at a level of 0.01. Further, the relatively higher Pseudo R-square value suggests 
that the models performed well. The size of each coefficient estimate relative to its standard error 




                                                 
13 No explicit tests were undertaken to test the content and predictive validity of the scales related to incentives.  The 
evidence for content validity was provided by the comprehensive review of literature and in-depth interviews.   16
Table 4 - Results of logistic regression analysis for ALL-PR (Model I): 
 
Description  Variables  Estimate Std. Error Wald Statistic  Significance
D = 1  1.845  3.209  0.331  0.565 
D = 2  5.020  3.213  2.441  0.118 
D = 3  9.335  3.255  8.228  0.004*** 
Cut-off Points 
D = 4  13.059  3.327  15.404  0.000*** 
CT -0.423  0.276 2.342 0.126 
HE -0.646  0.246 6.874  0.009*** 
PE 1.177  0.337  12.172  0.000*** 
GP 1.474  0.403  13.375  0.000*** 
SL 0.613  0.309  3.950  0.047** 
RT 1.201  0.372  10.440  0.001*** 
CP 0.006  0.263  0.058  0.810 
ER -0.511  0.277 3.396  0.065* 
AR 0.485  0.313  2.399  0.121 
Incentives 
LL -0.260  0.291 0.796 0.372 
Type FR  -1.338  0.748  3.199  0.074* 
Location ON  -0.454  0.318  2.039  0.153 
S -0.761  0.513  2.203  0.138 
M -1.663  0.592  7.896  0.005*** 
L -1.840  0.696  6.986  0.008*** 
Firm Size 
VL -1.940  0.945 4.211  0.040** 
SG -0.615  0.542 1.288 0.256 
CB 0.005  0.370  0.024  0.877 
MF 0.227  0.371  0.373  0.541 
Activities  
ST -0.843  0.319 6.978  0.008*** 
BF -0.468  0.364 1.651 0.199 
PK 0.258  0.327  0.623  0.430 
LG 1.067  0.608  3.077  0.079* 
PL 0.558  0.338  2.716  0.099* 
Products 
OA -0.445  0.447 0.992 0.319 
GC -0.262  0.401 0.428 0.513 
FS -0.004  0.386 0.012  0.913 
RS 0.443  0.344  1.663  0.197 
RU -0.135  0.418 0.104 0.747 
PC 0.474  0.389  1.481  0.224 
WS -0.635  0.351 3.270  0.071* 
Customers 
WI 0.008  0.503  0.028  0.867 
LC 0.673  0.379  3.149  0.076* 
PV 0.327  0.524  0.389  0.533 
IP 0.733  0.408  3.228  0.072* 
Sales Area 
IT 0.909  0.401  5.153  0.023** 
Model F value  330.64***        
Degrees of Freedom  41        
Pseudo R-square  0.776        
Notes: ***, **
 and * denote, respectively, statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 The cut-off points (threshold values) indicate the cumulative logits when the independent variables equal zero. 
These points are necessary for calculating predicted values but are relatively uninteresting.   17
Four individual incentives, namely good practice (GP), reputation (RT), procedural 
efficiency (PE), and human resource efficiency (HR) were significant in Model I (ALL-PR) at p 
= 0.01 and two others, sales (SL) and existing regulation (ER), were significant at p = 0.05 and 
0.1 respectively. Indeed, GP and RT were significant at p = 0.01 in all models, except Model IV 
in which none of the incentives were significant
15. The results for the FR-PR sample (Model III) 
were similar to those for ALL-PR. Financial implications/cost (CT) was significant at p = 0.10 
level in the ALL-ON sample (Model II). 
The logged odds/logits calculated for independent variables in the four models are 
presented in Table 5. The results highlight that these effects varied significantly between 
incentives. For example, an increase in the scale value of RT by one unit in Model I increased 
the logged odds of switching from "very low" to "very high" on the FSRI
16 by 1.20. However, 
with respect to SL, a unit increase in the scale value increased the logged odds of switching 
between these categories of only 0.61. Furthermore, a unit increases in the scale values for CT 
and LL decreased the logged odds of switching from “very low” to “very high” food safety 
responsiveness by 0.423 and 0.260 respectively. 
In the case of the dummy variables, a change in one unit implicitly compares the 
indicator group to the reference or omitted group (see, Borooah, 2002). Thus, the negative 
coefficients of 0.761 and 1.84 for “small” and “large” firms in Model I indicate that, ceteris 
paribus, the logged odds of moving from “very low” to “very high” food safety responsiveness 
were 0.76 and 1.80 lower than for very small firms
17.   
                                                 
15 Long (1997) suggests that logistic regression analysis techniques can provide biased results in the case of small 
samples. Therefore, the results from the PL-PR sample (n = 69) must be treated with caution. 
16 In fact, this reduction was the same regardless of the food safety responsiveness category (Di) under scrutiny. 
Therefore, it's more correct to say that a given incentive increases/decreases the logit of "very low" versus "very 
high". 
17 However, this is not to say that every small or large firm had a higher probability of being food safety responsive 
than every very small firm in that particular sample. Rather the correct interpretation is that, given two firms that   18
Table 5 - Logged odds of the models: 
 
 








CT -0.423 -0.855 -0.272  -1.119
HE -0.646 0.472 -1.006  0.270
PE 1.177 1.177 1.332  1.119
GP 1.474 2.689 1.564  1.945
SL 0.613 0.387 0.736  0.759
RT 1.201 1.719 1.380  1.112
CP 0.006 0.376 0.115  0.672
ER -0.511 -0.334 -0.943  -0.179
AR 0.485 -0.228 0.245  1.554
Incentives 
LL -0.260 0.008 -0.601  0.628
Type FR  -1.338 -2.108 NA  NA
Location ON  -0.454 NA -0.252  -0.258
VS NA 2.491 NA  3.411
S -0.761 1.673 -0.546  3.184
M -1.663 0.590 -1.167  NA
L -1.840 -0.641 -1.410  NA
Firm Size 
VL -1.940 NA -1.630  NA
SG -0.615 -1.549 -0.568  NA
CB 0.005 -0.413 0.228  -1.652
MF 0.227 1.499 0.345  -0.243
Activities 
ST -0.843 -1.174 -0.834  0.350
BF -0.468 -1.014 -0.444  1.157
PK 0.258 -1.025 0.182  0.945
LG 1.067 0.731 NA  -0.582
PL 0.558 -0.503 0.683  2.382
Products 
OA -0.445 -1.780 -0.472  -1.007
GC -0.262 -0.327 -0.119  NA
FS -0.004 0.742 0.003  NA
RS 0.443 0.759 0.718  1.632
RU -0.135 -0.717 0.002  -0.633
PC 0.474 1.591 0.920  -0.435
WS -0.635 -0.788 -0.557  0.280
Customers 
WI 0.008 0.726 -0.185  -0.717
LC 0.673 1.688 0.351  0.426
PV 0.327 0.720 0.002  1.125
IP 0.733 0.730 0.798  NA
Sales Area 
IT 0.909 1.196 0.751  NA
NA – This particular estimate was not available since the corresponding variable did not enter the model. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
were similar in respect of every characteristic except firm size, the larger firms was less likely to be in a higher 
category than a smaller firm.   19
Furthermore, the results indicate that FR firms (Model III) that export their products to 
international markets (IT) were 0.75 times more likely to be highly food safety responsive than 
those firms that did not export their products. Moreover, firms that engaged in slaughtering 
activities (SG) in Ontario (Model II) were 1.55 times less likely to be highly food safety 
responsive than those firms that did not slaughter. In the same model, firms that manufactured 
processed products (MG) were 1.5 times more likely to be highly food safety responsive than 
those firms that did not process. 
The effects on logged odds were next transformed to the effects on instantaneous 
(marginal) probabilities
18 (Table 6). The outcome suggests that GP, RT and PE had the higher 
effect in the ALL-PR model. Both ER and CT showed negative effects in this model.  
 
Table 6 – Instantaneous/marginal probabilities (partial derivatives): 








CT -0.10 -0.21 -0.06  -0.27
HE -0.16 0.11 -0.23  0.07
PE 0.29 0.29 0.30  0.27
GP 0.36 0.66 0.35  0.47
SL 0.15 0.09 0.17  0.18
RT 0.29 0.42 0.31  0.27
CP 0.00 0.09 0.03  0.16
ER -0.12 -0.08 -0.21  -0.04
AR 0.12 -0.06 0.05  0.38
LL -0.06 0.00 -0.13  0.15
 
This method works best with continuous variables for which small changes in the 
independent variables that define the tangent have meaning. However, since the relevant change 
occurs from 0 to 1 for dummy variables, the tangent line for small changes in these variables 
                                                 
18 Since the relationships between the independent variables and probabilities are non-linear and non-additive, they 
cannot be fully represented by a single coefficient.  The effect on the probabilities has to be identified at a 
particular value or set of values.  For the purpose of this analysis, 0.58 was taken as the mean probability of the 
dependent variable (p) for Models I and II and 0.66 and 0.42 for Models III and IV.   20
makes less sense. To overcome this shortcoming the “predicted probabilities” were calculated 
(Table 7) using the methods of Borooah (2002) and Pampel (2000). 
 
Table 7 - Predicted marginal probabilities: 








CT -0.11 -0.21 -0.06  -0.23
HE -0.16 0.11 -0.24  0.07
PE 0.24 0.24 0.22  0.27
GP 0.28 0.37 0.24  0.42
SL 0.14 0.09 0.14  0.19
RT 0.24 0.31 0.23  0.27
CP 0.00 0.09 0.03  0.17
ER -0.13 -0.08 -0.23  -0.04
AR 0.11 0.06 0.05  0.35
Incentives 
LL -0.06 0.00 -0.14  0.16
Type FR  -0.31 -0.44 NA  NA
Location ON  -0.11 NA -0.06  -0.06
VS NA 0.36 NA  0.54
S -0.19 0.30 -0.13  0.53
M -0.37 0.13 -0.28  NA
L -0.40 -0.16 -0.34  NA
Firm Size 
VL -0.41 NA -0.38  NA
SG -0.15 -0.35 -0.14  NA
CB 0.00 -0.10 0.05  -0.30
MF 0.05 0.28 0.07  -0.06
Activities 
ST -0.21 -0.28 -0.20  0.09
BF -0.12 -0.25 -0.11  0.27
PK 0.06 -0.25 0.04  0.23
LG 0.22 0.16 NA  -0.13
PL 0.13 -0.12 0.13  0.47
Products 
OA -0.11 -0.39 -0.11  -0.21
GC -0.06 -0.08 0.03  NA
FS 0.00 0.16 0.00  NA
RS 0.10 0.17 0.14  0.37
RU -0.03 -0.18 0.00  -0.14
PC 0.11 0.29 0.17  -0.10
WS -0.16 -0.19 -0.13  0.07
Customers 
WI 0.00 0.16 -0.04  -0.16
LC 0.15 0.30 0.07  0.11
PV 0.08 0.16 0.00  00.27
IP 0.16 0.16 0.15  NA
Sales Area 
IT 0.19 0.24 0.14  NA
NA – This particular estimate was not available since the corresponding variable did not enter into the model 
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Conclusions: 
As stated by Veeman (1999), there has been a paucity of economic analysis of food 
safety controls in Canada. Indeed, this is the first economic analysis of the incentives for 
Canadian food processors to adopt enhanced food safety controls, such as HACCP. The results 
suggest that decisions at the level of the firm regarding responsiveness to food safety issues are 
complex and motivated by a number of individual incentives. One of the most important 
outcomes of the analysis is that market-based incentives play the greatest role with respect to the 
level of food safety controls adopted by firms in the Canadian meat and poultry processing 
sector. Both Federally-registered (FR) and Provincially-licensed (PL) firms in the considered that 
adoption of such controls is a “good practice” (GP), enhances and protects their reputation (RT), 
and enhances the efficiency of their physical activities (PE), as the most important incentives for 
the adoption of enhanced food safety controls. The market-based incentives of increased sales 
(SL) and commercial pressure (CP) were important for FR firms, but less so for PL firms.   
Although, FR firms judged that the advantages of enhanced food safety controls justified the 
financial implications/costs (CT), PL firms, on the contrary, indicated that such costs had a 
negative impact on their food safety responsiveness. 
The influence of particular incentives on different categories of firms varies significantly.  
Existing government regulations (ER), ironically, are a disincentive for FR firms to adopt 
enhanced food safety practices. Anticipated future government regulations (AR), however, have 
little effect, since most of these firms have already implemented HACCP, for example because 
of the requirements of their customers. Conversely, ER was not a disincentive for PL firms, 
whilst AR was a significant motivation to adopt enhanced food safety controls. This reflects the 
fact that the Ontario government, in particular, is moving to induce HACCP implementation in   22
the meat and poultry processing sector though its “HACCP Advantage” program. For both types 
of firms, existing liability laws (LL) strongly motivate the adoption of enhanced food safety 
controls. 
To some extent these findings contradict previous studies of HACCP implementation, 
which suggest that regulatory requirements are paramount. The outcome of this analysis suggests 
that regulatory requirements are only one of a number of incentives that motivate firms to 
enhance their food safety controls. The challenge for policy-makers is, therefore, to move 
beyond traditional regulatory modes and to implement an incentive-based regulatory system that 
is sufficiently flexible to reflect differences in the incentive base of individual firms. In such a 
system, food safety standards and regulation need to be responsive to private incentives at the 
firm and sector levels, thus permitting firms to respond to and take advantage of market-based 
forces. Recent reforms at the Federal and Provincial levels in Canada, for example mandating 
HACCP in Federally-registered plants and the implementation of a voluntary HACCP standard 
in Ontario are part of this. 
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 Annex 1 - Results of logistic regression analysis for ALL-ON (Model II): 
 
Description  Variables  Estimate Std. Error Wald Statistic  Significance
D = 1  10.535  6.644  2.514  0.113 
D = 2  16.106  6.887  5.469  0.019 
D = 3  21.917  7.071  9.607  0.002*** 
Cut-off Points 
D = 4  27.084  7.427  13.298  0.000*** 
CT -0.855  0.511 2.794  0.095* 
HE 0.472  0.399  1.395  0.238 
PE 1.177  0.601  3.834  0.050** 
GP 2.689  0.915  8.632  0.003*** 
SL 0.387  0.567  0.466  0.495 
RT 1.719  0.880  3.819  0.051* 
CP 0.376  0.497  0.574  0.449 
ER -0.334  0.572 0.340  0.560 
AR -0.228  0.616 0.137  0.711 
Incentives 
LL 0.008  0.620  0.017  0.896 
Type FR  -2.108  1.516  1.935  0.164 
VS 2.491  1.613  2.385  0.122 
S 1.673  1.756  0.908  0.341 
M 0.590  1.461  0.163  0.686 
Firm Size 
L -0.641  1.348  0.226  0.634 
SG -1.549  1.173 1.744  0.187 
CB -0.413  0.727 0.322  0.570 
MF 1.499  0.687  4.768  0.029** 
Activities 
ST -1.174  0.623 3.556  0.059* 
BF -1.014  0.647 2.461  0.117 
PK -1.025  0.634 2.614  0.106 
LG 0.731  1.059  0.477  0.490 
PL -0.503  0.684 0.541  0.462 
Products 
OA -1.780  0.849 4.395  0.036** 
GC -0.327  0.793 0.170  0.680 
FS 0.742  0.764  0.943  0.331 
RS 0.759  0.604  1.580  0.209 
RU -0.717  0.803 0.797  0.372 
PC 1.591  0.686  5.380  0.020** 
WS -0.788  0.629 1.569  0.210 
Customers 
WI 0.726  0.921  0.621  0.431 
LC 1.688  0.727  5.395  0.020** 
PV 0.720  0.981  0.539  0.463 
IP 0.730  0.859  0.722  0.396 
Sales Area 
IT 1.196  0.802  2.224  0.136 
Model F value  200.71***        
Degrees of 
Freedom 
40        
Pseudo R-square  0.868        
Notes: ***, **
 and * denote, respectively, statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels.   29
Annex 2 - Results of logistic regression analysis for FR-PR (Model III): 
 
Description  Variables  Estimate Std. Error Wald Statistic  Significance
D = 1  1.171  4.276  0.075  0.784 
D = 2  3.730  4.249  0.771  0.380 
D = 3  8.299  4.308  3.710  0.054* 
Cut-off Points 
D = 4  12.304  4.381  7.888  0.005*** 
CT -0.272  0.372  0.537  0.463 
HE -1.006  0.310  10.501  0.001** 
PE 1.332  0.405  10.837  0.001*** 
GP 1.564  0.483  10.494  0.001*** 
SL 0.736  0.425  2.995  0.084* 
RT 1.380  0.447  9.521  0.002*** 
CP 0.115  0.340  0.114  0.736 
ER -0.943  0.333  8.026  0.005*** 
AR 0.245  0.370  0.438  0.508 
Incentives 
LL -0.601  0.374  2.573  0.109 
Location ON  -0.252  0.395 0.406  0.524 
S -0.546  0.822  0.441  0.507 
M -1.167  0.802  2.115  0.146 
L -1.410  0.905  2.430  0.119 
Firm Size 
VL -1.630  1.115  2.140  0.144 
SG -0.568  .570  0.992  0.319 
CB 0.228  0.419  0.297  0.586 
MF 0.345  0.477  0.524  0.469 
Activities 
ST -0.834  0.382  4.759  0.029** 
BF -0.444  0.420  1.113  0.291 
PK 0.182  0.378  0.233  0.630 
PL 0.683  0.381  3.212  0.073* 
Products 
OA -0.472  0.603  0.614  0.433 
GC -0.119  0.447  0.071  0.790 
FS 0.003  0.416  0.009  0.925 
RS 0.718  0.443  2.624  0.105 
RU 0.002  0.566  0.002  0.963 
PC 0.920  0.498  3.419  0.064* 
WS -0.557  0.423 1.729  0.189 
Customers 
WI -0.185  0.665  0.077  0.781 
LC 0.351  0.437  0.645  0.422 
PV 0.002  0.629  0.002  0.969 
IP 0.798  0.442  3.259  0.071* 
Sales Area 
IT 0.751  0.418  3.222  0.073* 
Model F value  189.54***        
Degrees of 
Freedom 
39        
Pseudo R-square  0.800        
Notes: ***, **
 and * denote, respectively, statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels.   30
Annex 3 - Results of logistic regression analysis for PL-PR (Model IV): 
 
Description  Variables  Estimate Std. Error Wald Statistic  Significance
D = 1  19.481  9.158  4.525  0.033** 
D = 2  24.234  9.469  6.550  0.010*** 
D = 3  30.743  9.828  9.785  0.002** 
Cut-off Points 
D = 4  34.080  9.803  12.086  0.001** 
CT -1.119  0.718  2.428  0.119 
HE 0.270  0.726  0.138  0.710 
PE 1.119  1.049  1.136  0.286 
GP 1.945  1.316  2.184  0.139 
SL 0.759  0.789  0.925  0.336 
RT 1.112  1.028  1.170  0.279 
CP 0.672  0.744  0.815  0.367 
ER -0.179  0.876  0.042  0.838 
AR 1.554  1.019  2.326  0.127 
Incentives 
LL 0.628  0.889  0.499  0.480 
Location ON  -0.258  0.797 0.104  0.747 
VS 3.411  2.225  2.351  0.125  Firm Size 
S 3.184  1.893  2.830  0.093* 
CB -1.652  1.273  1.685  0.194 
MF -0.243  1.035  0.055  0.815 
Activities 
ST 0.350  0.945  0.137  0.711 
BF 1.157  1.210  0.914  0.339 
PK 0.945  1.178  0.644  0.422 
LG -0.582  1.195  0.237  0.626 
PL 2.382  1.285  3.435  0.064* 
Products 
OA -1.007  1.096  0.845  0.358 
RS 1.632  1.016  2.580  0.108 
RU -0.633  0.997  0.403  0.526 
PC -0.435  1.161  0.141  0.708 
WS 0.280  1.060  0.070  0.792 
Customers 
WI -0.717  1.755  0.167  0.683 
LC 0.426  1.610  0.070  0.791  Sales Area 
PV 1.125  1.683  0.447  0.504 
Model F value  91.58***        
Degrees of 
Freedom 
31        
Pseudo R-square  0.701        
Notes: ***, **
 and * denote, respectively, statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 